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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) whereby the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over orders, judgments, and
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction. This case was then assigned to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and ordinances are determinative or of
central importance to this appeal: Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about October 7,1987, Defendants submitted a written brokerage proposal to
Plaintiff, Interport, Inc. concerning the sale of firearms owned by Plaintiff, Interport, Inc. This
proposal was in the form of a letter to Mr. William York, a principal of Interport, Inc. Under the
terms of the proposal, Defendants were to grade all weapons, store all weapons, prepare
advertising, sell all firearms and ship them to purchasers, keep sales records and provide a
detailed accounting to Plaintiff Interport, Inc. of all sales, receive 30% gross profits, and remit all
other proceeds on a weekly basis to Interport, Inc..
The proposal was accepted by Plaintiff, Interport, Inc., and on or about November of
1987, Plaintiffs delivered to Defendants 1,380 firearms. At the end of January 1988, Defendants
provided Plaintiff Interport, Inc. with a detailed accounting, supported by sales slips showing
1

customers' names, addresses, merchandise sold, dates of sales, and amounts received.
Subsequently, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with proper accountings.
On or about April 24,1990, Plaintiff Interport, Inc. brought an action in the Fifth Judicial
District Court against Defendants praying for a full accounting and for a judgment of amounts
owed by Defendants under the agreement. William York was then added as a Plaintiff. After
much litigation, in February, 1995, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with
a supporting memorandum and affidavit and then an Amended Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment.
In those documents, Defendants alleged that Interport, Inc. was not a party to the
agreement for Defendants to sell firearms and asked for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff
Interport, Inc. This motion was supported by the Affidavit of Gary Delsignore in which he avers
that the original proposal was not made to Interport and that William York made it perfectly clear
to him that the agreement was to be with Mr. York personally and not with Interport, Inc.
Affidavit of Gary Delsignorefflf3,4.
Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment along with an Affidavit of William M. York on April 24,1995. Mr. York states in his
affidavit that Defendants were always aware that he was acting for, and on behalf of, Interport,
Inc. in the brokerage arrangements. Affidavit of William M. York ^ 4. In addition he asserts that
all shipments of firearms were picked up by the Defendants directly from the Interport, Inc.
warehouse in St. George, Utah. Id Furthermore, attached to Mr. York's affidavit were
documents prepared by the Defendants reporting sales of the rifles. Those documents refer to
"Interport guns" and "Interport's Net Profit."
2

A hearing on the matter was held before the Honorable Judge Robert T. Braithwaite and
the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by an order signed on June 6,1995,
and a judgment to that effect was to be prepared by the Defendants. The Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order were then signed on January 30,1996. Final summary judgment
against Plaintiff Interport, Inc. was entered by an Order of Certification signed by the Honorable
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite on April 5,1996. Plaintiff Interport, Inc. now appeals the final
summary judgment entered against it by the District Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment is
appropriate only when there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. There are two issues before the court: whether there is a genuine
dispute as to a material fact and whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The Plaintiffs and Defendants in this case have eachfiledaffidavits and pleadings with the
trial court that indicate that there exists a dispute as to who the actual parties to the contract were.
In light this dispute and because that fact is central to the litigation, there is a genuine issue of
material fact. In addition, because the trial court considered this disputed fact when granting
summary judgment, the Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs requests that summary judgment be overturned and the matter remanded
to the trial court for further determination of that issue of fact.

3

ARGUMENT
The standard for properly granting summary judgment is comprised of two parts. Rule
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment is appropriate only
when there is no issue of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v. Garfield County. 811 P.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1991);
B & A Assoc, v. L.A.Young Sons Constr.. 796 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Summary judgment is proper only if there are no material disputed facts and then, taking the
undisputed facts into account, if the moving party is then entitled to judgment based on the law.
The trial court's entry of summary judgment is to be reviewed for correctness, according no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Christensen v. Swenson. 874 P.2d 125,127
(Utah 1994); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037,1039-40 (Utah 1991); Blue Cross &
Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
I.

IN LIGHT OF THE PLEADINGS AND AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED TO
THE TRIAL COURT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST INTERPORT,
INC, WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL
FACT EXISTS.
A.

An issue of fact exists.

As Rule 56(c) explains, for summary judgment to be proper, there must be no dispute as
to any fact that is central to the determination of the case. This requirement encompasses two
issues: first, are there facts in dispute; second, are any of those facts "material."
In the case before this Court, a dispute as to a fact exists between the Plaintiff Interport,
Inc. and the Defendant Gary Delsignore. The parties have given conflicting information in
pleadings and affidavits filed with the court. The dispute centers on whether or not Plaintiff
4

Interport, Inc. is a party to the contract for sale of weapons that is the subject of this litigation.
First, Plaintiff Interport, Inc. states in its complaint that "On or about October 7,1987,
Defendants submitted a written proposal to Plaintiff concerning sale of firearms owned by
Plaintiff." Complaint f 3. The Plaintiff referred to in this document is Interport, Inc. because at
this time William York was not a named Plaintiff. In their answer, Defendants deny that they
ever entered into any proposal or agreement with Plaintiff Interport, Inc., but state that they
entered into an agreement with William York. Answer ^ 3.
The dispute over whether Interport is a party to the contract for sale of rifles is also
evident in the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment and accompanying affidavits. Mr.
Delsignore's affidavit states that his proposal was not made to Interport. Inc. Affidavit of Gary
Delsignore ]f 3. Furthermore, he states that Mr. York made it clear to him that the contract was
not to be with Interport, Inc. but with Mr. York personally. Id at f 4. In conflict with that
statement, Mr. York asserts in his affidavit that in all of his dealings with Defendants,
Defendants were aware that Mr. York was acting for an in behalf of Interport, Inc. in his capacity
as a principal for Interport, and that all shipments of firearms were picked up from Interport,
Inc.'s warehouse. IdL In addition, attached to Mr. York's affidavit are two documents prepared
by Defendants in rendering an accounting of the sales of the guns; in those documents, there are
references to "Interport guns" and "Interport's Net Profit."
It is important to note that "(I)t only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on
the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact. This is analogous to the elemental
rule that the fact trier may believe one witness as against many, or many against one." Holbrook
Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975). Furthermore, "it is not the purpose of the
5

summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or
the weight of evidence." Id
Given the pleadings and other papers in which the parties make contrary averments, it is
apparent that there is a disputed issue of fact. The trial court judge cannot simply ignore the
affidavit of Mr. York averring that the Defendants knew that Interport was the actual party to the
contract. Nor can the trial court discount or weigh the credibility of that averment. As the Utah
Supreme Court explained, that is not the job of the trial court in a summary judgment proceeding.

14
B.

The disputed fact is material.

The second requirement is that the disputed fact be material. The contract to broker rifles
is the central issue of this case. Interport, Inc. brought this suit against the Defendants asking for
a full accounting of the sales of Interport's guns and also for judgment for any money owed to
Interport, Inc. after the accounting is completed. Who the parties to the contract are is a central
issue in this case. It determines who is bound by the contract and also to whom performance is
to be rendered. The disputed fact is a material one.

II.

BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW, FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
INTERPORT, INC. WAS IMPROPER.

When making a determination on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may
only consider facts that are not in dispute, and then summary judgment should be granted only if
all of the facts giving rise to the moving parties' entitlement to summary judgment are clearly
established or admitted. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 1978). Furthermore,
6

because there is not a trial on the merits, in reviewing an entry of summary judgment, an
appellate court must review the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the summary judgment has been granted. Christensen v. Swenson. 874 P.2d 125,
127 (Utah 1994); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Atlas
Corp. v. ClovisNafIBank. 737P.2d225,229 (Utah 1987).
In the case before this Court, the Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. There is a dispute, as evident in the pleadings and affidavits, as to who is the proper party to
the contract. Regardless of that dispute, the trial court determined that Interport Inc. was not a
party to the contract. Whether or not Interport, Inc. is a party to the contract is a disputed fact
and therefore should not be considered in determining whether a party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. As the disputed fact is the exact matter on which the trial court granted summary
judgment, it is impossible to conclude that the court did not consider the disputed fact in its
decision. Because it was improper to do so, judgment as a matter of law is not warranted.
Furthermore, this Court must look at the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to
the losing party below, in this case Interport, Inc. Viewing the competing affidavits in a light
most favorable to Interport, this Court must conclude Interport, Inc. was the party to whom the
proposal was made. This is based on Mr. York's own affidavit and also the documents prepared
by the Defendants in which they refer to "Interport guns" and "Interport's Net Profit." The
inference to be drawn from these documents when viewing them in a light most favorable to
Interport is the Defendants knew Interport was party to the contract, case, in which case the
Defendants would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law in this case.

7

CONCLUSION
If it is determined that there is a dispute regarding a genuine issue of material fact, then
this Court must reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for determination of
that issue. Christensen v. Swenson. 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nafl
Bank. 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987). Because a genuine issue of fact exists, and because the
Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Interport, Inc. respectfully requests
that the granting of summary judgment be overturned and the case remanded to the trial court for
determination of the issue of fact.

DATED this 19th day of December, 1996.

McDOUGAL & SMITH

1
istina M. Neal
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing,
postage prepaid, to James M. Park, The Park Firm, 965 South Main, Suite 3, Cedar City,
Utah 84720 on this the 19th day of December, 1996.

9

ADDENDUM

THE PARK FIRM, PC.
JAMES M. PARK (5408)
P.O. Box 765
965 South Main, Suite 3
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801)586-6532

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

INTERPORT, INC., a corporation
and WILLIAM YORK,

;
])
)
]1

AFFIDAVIT OF
GARY DELSIGNORE

vs.

])

Civil No. 900901098

GARY DELSIGNORE and SHIRLEY
NICHOLAS, individually and doing
business as QUALITY MILITARY
WEAPONS,

])
]
]
)

Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

1

]

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
GARY DELSIGNORE, after being duly sworn deposes and says:
1. He is one of the Defendant above named.
2. On or about October 7, 1987, he was the Defendant who submitted a written proposal
to William York regarding the sale of certain firearms. Said proposal is attached to Plaintiffs firs
Complaint and marked Exhibit "A".
3. Said proposal was not made to Interport, Inc.
4. Plaintiff made it perfectly clear that this agreement was to be with him only and no

Interport because of the problems Interport was having with the ATF. At this time the
Agreement was entered into or shortly before this Defendant was president of Interport Inc
Plaintiff wanted this agreement between himself and Defendant.
5. This Defendant has never received notification that the agreement attached to Plaintiffs
Complaint and marked Exhibit "A", was ever assigned to Interport, Inc.
5. All payments made were to William York. No payments of any kind were made to
Interport, Inc.
6. Shirley Nicholas was also never a part of the agreement between York and Delsignore.
DATED this ^ 7

day of February, 1995.

GARY
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to befofe rxiihis

_

Q'^6day of February,

A.

DM'. • C ^ t a r S S p O f A R Y PUBLIC
\«i fel&R )lj
vX^Vt/

h i 'iOSTH 3CC EAST
CHCV* CITY, UT S4/20

1995

WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
William H. Leigh - #5307
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT
84720-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

INTERPORT, INC., a
corporation; and WILLIAM YORK,

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM M. YORK

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GARY DELSIGNORE and SHIRLEY
NICHOLAS, individually and
doing business as QUALITY
MILITARY WEAPONS,

Civil No. 900901098 CV

Defendants.

STATE OF
: ss
County of

.)

COMES NOW WILLIAM M. YORK, after first being duly sworn upon
his oath, and testifies and asserts as follows, to wit:
1.

Your affiant, William M. York, is an adult ipale and a

resident of Douglas County, Nevada, and is a v/itness in the aboveentitled action, and asserts the information set forth herein based
upon personal knov/ledge.
2.

Your affiant asserts that Shirley Renea Nicholas did own,

operate, and held ownership interest jointly with Gary Delsignore

in a weapons business located in Iron County, Utah during and
before the period having to do with the brokerage sale of the
1380+or- Enfield rifles and subject of this action.
3.

Your

affiant

asserts

that

this

joint

ownership

was

revealed verbally to myself on a number of occasions personally
both by Gary Delsignore, and by Shirley Renea Nicholas.
4.

Your affiant asserts that in his initial and su)sequent

dealings with Defendants, Defendants were aware that affiant was
acting for, and on behalf of Interport, Inc. in the brokerage
arrangements.

That all

shipments

of firearms were

picked

up

directly from the Interport, Inc. warehouse in St. George, Utah, by
Nicholas

and/or

brokerage

Delsignore.

contract

between

Affiant
Interport,

also

asserts

Inc. and

that

the

Defendants

was

mostly verbal and trust.
5.

Your affiant asserts that payments by Defendants on the

brokerage "agreement" in the amounts of $5,199.21, $2,723.53 and
$2,500 were made to Interport, Inc.
6.

Your affiant asserts that on the attached documents,

which were either prepared by Delsignore or Nicholas as reports of
the

sales

of

acknowledged
documents

the

they

refer

to

rifles
were

they

dealing

"Total

Sales

"Interport's Net Profit".
2

were
with
of

brokering,
Interport,

Interport

Defendants

Inc.
Guns",

as
and

the
to

FURTHER, AFFIANT SAITH NOT.
DATED this ^ S ^

day of

HA.\^

1995,

AA2
WILLIAM M. YORK, Affiant

V
The attached AFFIDAVIT of William M. York was SUBSCRIBED AND
SWORN TO before me this

^^-dav ofTW/A&A
/I )ftfa

A^

, 1995.

NOTARY PUBLIC
ri^xpires
My commission,
Residing in
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i f o ^ J
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TIFTH JUDICIAL DIST COURT
IRON C O U N T Y

WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483

APR 2 3 1990
,CLERK
sarflvi,WrDEPUTY

llQXJC-L.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
INTERPORT, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,

C O M P L A I N T
vs.
G A R Y D E L E I G N O R E and S H I R L E Y
N I C H O L S , individually and doing
b u s i n e s s a s "QUALITY M I L I T A R Y
WEAPONS",

C i v i l No.

Q

,Q-

l0?"3^

Defendants.

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, by and through counsel, who complains
ci Defendants and for cause of action alleges as follows:
I

PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS

1.

Plaintiff INTERPORT, INC., is a' corporation.

2.

Defendants

GARY

DELSIGNORE

and

SHIRLEY

NICHOLS

are

residents of Iron County, Utah, and at time pertinent to this

I

action were and are doing business under the name of "QUALITY
MILITARY WEAPONS"
3.

On or about October

7, 1987, Defendants submitted a

written proposal to Plaintiff concerning sale of firearms owned
by Plaintiff, under the following terms:
A.

Defendants were to grade all weapons.)

B.

Defendants were to store all weapons in Cedar City,

Utah, at their expense.

C.

Defendants were to prepare advertising.

D.

Defendants were to sell all firearms, and ship them

to the purchasers.
E.

Defendants were to keep sales records and provide a

detailed accounting of all sales.
F.

Defendants were to receive and retain amounts equal

to thirty percent (30%) of gross sales, and were to remit
all other proceeds on a weekly basis.
A copy of the written proposal is attached, and is incorporated
by this reference, marked as Exhibit "A".
4.

Both

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

GARY

DELSIGNORE

were

holders of the applicable federal firearms licenses at times
pertinent to this action.

Sellers of firearms are required by

federal.
5.

The

proposal* of

Defendants

Plaintiff, and in or about November

was

duly

accepted

by

of 1987, Plaintiff duly

delivered to Defendants, 1,380 firearms.
6.

At the end of January

of 1988, Defendants

provided

Plaintiff with a detailed accounting, supported by sales slips
showing customers1 names, addresses, merchandise sold, dates of
sales, and

amounts

received.

attached, marked as Exhibit

A

copy

of

the accounting

is

"B", and is incorporated by this

reference.
7.

Since January of 1988, reports/accountings furnished by

Defendants have been incomplete.
requested

by

When detailed accountings were

Plaintiff, Defendants

have

responded

evasively,

abusively, and have failed to provide to information necessary to
-2-

document and back up their "reports".
Defendants

have failed

to meet

the

Since January of 1988,
standard

established

and

provided in their first accounting, and have failed and refused
to abide by the terms of their contract with Plaintiff.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment)
8.

Plaintiff

incorporates

the

allegations

made

in

paragraphs 1 through 6, above, as though fully set forth in this
First Cause of Action.
9.

A dispute now exists between the parties with reference

to the agreement between them, including, but not limited to:

I
A.

Provision

of

proper

accountings, with

underlying

back up documentation, to which Plaintiff is entitled.
B.

Payment of amounts owed by Defendants to Plaintiff.

C.

Compliance by Defendants with federal law relating

to the keeping of records relating to sales of firearms.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays:
•1.

For judgment declaring the parties1 rights, duties, and

legal relationships between them under their agreement relating
to the sale of Plaintiff's firearms, and for judgment requiring
Defendants to furnish complete, detailed accountings.
2.

For

judgment

in

favor

of

Plaintiff

and

against

Defendants in the amount shown to be due and owing to Plaintiff
I
from Defendants, if any,
3.

For costs.

4.

For attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff.
-3-

5.

For such other relief as the Court deems proper,

DATED this

\^jL

day of April, 1990/

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
1091 Airport Road
Douglas County, NV 89423-9030
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FIFTH JUDICIAL JiST CeimT
IRON C O U N T Y

SCOTT M. BURNS - USB #4 28 3
Attorney at Law
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694
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DEPUTE

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
INTERPORT, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,

ANSWER

vs.
GARY DELSIGNORE and SHIRLEY
NICHOLS, individually and doing
business as "QUALITY MILITARY
WEAPONS",

Civil No. 900901098

Defendants.
COME NOW Defendants, by and

through

Scott M. Burns, and

answer Plaintiff's Complaint and allegations as follows, to wit:
1.

Defendants admit paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint.

2.

Defendants

admit

that

GARY

DELSIGNORE

and

SHIRLEY

NICHOLS are residents of Iron County, State of Utah; however,
SHIRLEY NICHOLS denies that she has ever done business under the
name of "QUALITY MILITARY WEAPONS".
3.

Defendants deny that they have ever entered into any

proposal or agreement with Plaintiff INTERPORT, INC., but did, on
or

about

William

the date alleged,
York.

"QUALITY
contained

Defendant

MILITARY

GARY

WEAPONS",

in paragraph

enter

into

an agreement

DELSIGNORE,

admits

all

3 of Plaintiff's

doing
of

with

business

the

Complaint.

one
as

allegations
However,

Defendant

SHIRLEY

NICHOLS

denies

each

and

every

allegation

contained in paragraph 3 and affirmatively asserts that she has
no connection with or liability associated with "QUALITY MILITARY
WEAPONS".
"QUALITY

Moreover, Defendant GARY DELSIGNORE, doing business as
MILITARY

WEAPONS",

asserts

that

he

has

previously

submitted, and attached hereto, copies of all receipts therein
representing a full accounting and has therein abided by all of
the requirements of the written proposal of October 7, 1987.
4.

With respect to paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Complaint,

Defendant GARY DELSIGNORE admits that he has been, and

is, a

holder of the applicable federal firearms license at all times
pertinent to this action.

However, Defendant GARY

DELSIGNORE

denies any knowledge of or cannot assert Plaintiff's status with
respect to firearms licenses.
5.

Pursuant

to

paragraph

5

of

Plaintiff's

Complaint,

Defendant GARY DELSIGNORE admits that Plaintiff delivered several
firearms and "parts of firearms" in or about November, 1987, but
denies that exactly

1,380

firearms were delivered.

Defendant

SHIRLEY NICHOLS denies that any firearms were ever delivered to
her.
6.

Defendants admit the allegations contained and asserted

in paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
7.

Defendants

deny

the

allegations

contained

in

paragraph 7 with respect to assertions that the Defendants have
been

"evasive"

and

"abusive"

but

-2-

admit that

they

have

not

furnished a full accounting to one William York, with whom the
written agreement was entered into by GARY DELSIGNORE.
8.

Defendants deny a dispute between them and Plaintiff

INTERPORT, INC., but do admit that there is a dispute between
Defendant

GARY DELSIGNORE,

individually

and

doing

business as

"QUALITY MILITARY WEAPONS11, and William York with respect to a
proper

accounting

DELSIGNORE

and

believes

underlying

that

William

documentation
York

is

in

that

attempting

to

GARY
(a)

discern who his clients are, (b) cause trouble with said clients,
or

(c) appropriate

clients7

said

business

from

said

GARY

DELSIGNORE.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action for
which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant

SHIRLEY

NICHOLS

has

never

done

business

as

"QUALITY MILITARY WEAPONS" and has had no contractual dealings,
whatsoever, with INTERPORT, INC., a corporation, or William York.
THIRD DEFENSE
Defendants

GARY

DELSIGNORE,

SHIRLEY

NICHOLS,

and

GARY

DELSIGNORE individually and doing business as "QUALITY MILITARY
WEAPONS"

never

entered

into

any

"written

proposal"

with

INTERPORT, INC., a corporation; however, GARY DELSIGNORE entered
into a written proposal,

dated October 7, 1987, with one William

-3-

York, individually, as evidenced by Exhibit "A" of Plaintiff's
Complaint.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Defendants assert that their actions were and are proper,
reasonable, and justified under the circumstances.
FIFTH DEFENSE
No affirmative link exists between the complained of events
and Defendants' actions and, therefore, these Defendants cannot
be liable and the Complaint should be dismissed as against them.
WHEREFORE, having answered Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendants
pray

that

the

Court

find

that

the

Plaintiff's

action

is

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation and dismiss said
action, and award Defendants costs and reasonable attorney's fees
as allowed under law.
DATED this

/ V^

day of June, 1990.

SCOTT M. BURNS
Iron County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I

HEREBY

CERTIFY

that I hand-delivered

a full, true and

correct copy of the within and foregoing ANSWER to Mr. Willard R.
Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 36 North 300 West, Cedar City,
Utah, on this

I ftfc:
Ii
— day of June,

